The Intelligibility of Ronald Dwokin’s Theory of Legal Interpretation

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.48162/rev.100.005

Abstract

 

The aim of this article is to explain the premises of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation. The theory of reference is characterized by its complexity to help a flesh and bones judge to solve the cases presented to him. In this aspect, in order to explain this, the relation between law and moral, the essence of interpretative objectivity, the notion of theoretical disagreements, the nature of legal concepts the interpretative stages, the interpreter’s moral responsibility and the human dignity standard will be developed. The conclusion that we hope to reach is that the Dworkin’s theory of interpretation is not reduced to three concatenated stages (pre–interpretative, interpretation in strict sense and post–interpretative). On the contrary, it integrates certain premises that are closely linked and make it comprehension possible. 

 

Author Biography

Erman Barbarito Tejeda, Universidad Austral (Argentina)

PhD in Law, Austral University (Argentina). Lawyer, National University of Rosario (Argentina).

References

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Published

2023-04-05

How to Cite

Tejeda, E. B. (2023). The Intelligibility of Ronald Dwokin’s Theory of Legal Interpretation. República Y Derecho, 8(8), 1–27. https://doi.org/10.48162/rev.100.005

Issue

Vol. 8 No. 8 (2023): (Continuous publication)

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Articles

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